Many of the motivating examples and applications of non-cooperative bargaining involve groups bargaining against each other. However, much of the literature ignores the structures of profit sharing within the group. This structure determines the incentives for each player and there by determines the bargaining power of each group. We [...]

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding to the Condorcet model a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives—as well as [...]

We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining game with three players who split a fixed surplus in every period. The status quo allocation evolves endogenously over time, as agents can approve new proposals by simple majority rule. One player is permanently endowed with veto power, and must approve any [...]