Sincere Voting in Large Elections
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the electorate is large. Here, we reverse [...]
Many of the motivating examples and applications of non-cooperative bargaining involve groups bargaining against each other. However, much of the literature ignores the structures of profit sharing within the group. This structure determines the [...]
We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining game with three players who split a fixed surplus in every period. The status quo allocation evolves endogenously over time, as agents can approve new proposals by [...]
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the electorate is large. Here, we reverse [...]
Many of the motivating examples and applications of non-cooperative bargaining involve groups bargaining against each other. However, much of the literature ignores the structures [...]
We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining game with three players who split a fixed surplus in every period. The status quo allocation evolves [...]
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere voting is not typically an equilibrium of [...]
Many of the motivating examples and applications of non-cooperative bargaining involve groups bargaining [...]
We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining game with three players who split [...]